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Abstract
This study considers the politics of public education and its impacts on economic
growth and welfare across generations. Public education is funded by taxing the
labor income of the working generation and capital income of the retired. We employ
probabilistic voting to demonstrate the politics of taxes and expenditure and show
that aging results in a shift of the tax burden from the old to the young and a
slowdown of economic growth. We then consider three alternative constraints that
limit the choice of taxes and/or expenditure: a minimum level of public education
expenditure, an upper limit of the capital income tax rate, and a combination of the
two. These constraints all create a trade-o between current and future generations
in terms of welfare.
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1 Introduction
This study considers the politics of public education and its impacts on economic growth
and welfare across generations, a topic widely researched since Saint-Paul and Verdier
(1993). Given population aging and the increasing share of the elderly in voting in many
developed countries (OECD, 2007), public education expenditure in these countries is
expected to decrease in the future (see Cattaneo and Wolter, 2009 and the references
therein). Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) and Kunze (2014) examine this prediction
in a two-period-lived overlapping-generations model including a conict of interest be-
tween generations over public education. In their analyses, public education expenditure
is funded by consumption tax (Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004) or labor income tax
(Kunze, 2014). Capital income tax on interest income, paid by the retired elderly who
benet little from public education, is abstracted from their analyses.1
In many OECD countries, income tax accounts for the largest share of tax revenue.
Income tax includes all forms of labor and capital income taxes. In a lifecycle model, labor
income tax is a burden on the working generation, while capital income tax is a burden
on the retired elderly. The model suggests that a conict of interest between the working
generation and retired arises when we consider an option for nancing public education
expenditure. In addition, taxing capital income discourages saving and investment and
thus may negatively aect economic growth (Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986; Atkeson, Chari,
and Kehoe, 1999). The argument thus far suggests that capital income tax should be
included in the analysis when we consider the politics of public education funding and its
impact on economic growth in the lifecycle framework.
Motivated by the argument above, this study presents a two-period-lived overlapping-
generations model with physical and human capital accumulation (Lambrecht, Michel, and
Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014; Ono and Uchida, 2016). Public education contributes to human
capital formation, and it is funded by taxing the labor income of the working generation
(i.e., the young) and capital income of the retired generation (i.e., the old). Within this
framework, we employ probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In each
period, the government representing the young and old chooses taxes and expenditure
to maximize the weighted sum of the utility of the young and old. Based on this voting
mechanism, we demonstrate the political determinant of both taxes and expenditure and
its impacts on economic growth. In particular, we show that increased political weight on
the old, stemming from population aging, results in a shift of the tax burden from the old
1Apart from the works mentioned above, a number of studies present an intergenerational conict
over public education expenditure (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2012; Kaganovich and Meier, 2012;
Kaganovich and Zilcha, 2012; Naito, 2012; Lancia and Russo, 2016; Ono and Uchida, 2016; Bishnu
and Wang, 2017). However, their analyses also lack a discussion on capital income tax.
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to the young and a reduction in public education expenditure. The model thus predicts
that aging has a negative impact on economic growth via the choice of scal policy.
The negative growth eect of population aging suggests that aging developed countries
are under pressure to take policy action against lower growth rates. For this policy
purpose, the present study considers three alternative constraints that limit the choice of
taxes and/or expenditure: a minimum level of public education expenditure, an upper
limit of the capital income tax rate, and a combination of the two. We show that the
minimum constraint increases public education expenditure, promotes economic growth,
and thus benets future generations. However, it forces the government to raise the
capital income tax rate to nance its increased expenditure, and therefore worsens the
initial old generation. Thus, the constraint creates a trade-o between current and future
generations in terms of welfare.
Such a trade-o still arises when we alternatively assume the upper limit constraint
on capital income tax. The initial old are made better o because the constraint reduces
their tax burden. However, future generations are made worse o because the constraint
reduces tax revenue and thus public education expenditure as an engine of economic
growth. In addition, we show that the combination of the two constraints fails to resolve
each scenario's shortcoming. Therefore, our analysis indicates that constraints on scal
policy choice involve a trade-o between current and future generations in terms of welfare.
The presented analysis of policy constraints uses the Pareto criterion. To view the
welfare implications from an alternative perspective, we consider a benevolent planner
who can commit to all his or her choices at the beginning of a period, subject to the
resource constraint. Assuming such a planner, we evaluate the political equilibrium in
the absence and presence of policy choice constraints by comparing it with the planner's
allocation. Based on a numerical method, we nd that the political equilibrium attains
a higher (lower) growth rate than the planner's allocation for most discount factors of
the planner when the minimum constraint of public education is active (inactive). In
addition, in the presence of the minimum constraint, earlier generations are made worse
o, while later generations are made better o by the political decision making.
The present study relates to the literature on the politics of capital income taxation
in the overlapping-generations framework. Earlier studies assumed no production sector
and said nothing about the eect of capital income (i.e., interest rate income) taxation
on economic growth (Renstrom, 1996; Human, 1996; Dolmas and Human, 1997). In
addition, these studies drop the conict of interest between generations from their analy-
ses by assuming that either the young or the old generation is decisive in voting. Notable
exceptions are Soares (2006) and Razin and Sadka (2007), but they cannot fully present
the generational conict because they assume equal tax rates on labor and capital in-
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come. Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2004) and Mateos-Planas (2010) overcome this point
by assuming dierent tax rates on capital and labor income and investigate the eect of
population aging on the capital income tax choice. The last four studies, however, focus
on the politics of capital income taxation and ignore economic growth and welfare across
generations. The present study contributes to the literature by addressing this neglected
issue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes an economic equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes a political equilibrium
and investigates the eects of political conict on economic growth. Section 4 evaluates
three alternative policy constraints in terms of growth and welfare. Section 5 compares
the political equilibrium with the planner's allocation. Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Model
The discrete time economy starts in period 0 and consists of overlapping generations.
Individuals are identical within a generation and live for three periods: youth, middle,
and elderly ages. Each middle-aged individual gives birth to 1 + n children. The middle-
aged population for period t is Nt and the population grows at a constant rate of n(>  1) :
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals display the following economic behavior over their lifecycles. During youth,
they make no economic decisions and receive public education nanced by the government.
In middle age, individuals work, receive market wages, and make tax payments. They
use after-tax income for consumption and savings. Individuals retire in their elderly years
and receive and consume returns from savings.
Consider an individual born in period t  1. In period t, the individual is middle-aged
and endowed with ht units of human capital. He or she supplies them inelastically in
the labor market and obtains labor income wtht, where wt is the wage rate per ecient
unit of labor in period t. After paying tax twtht, where t 2 (0; 1) is the period t labor
income tax rate, the individual distributes the after-tax income between consumption ct
and savings invested in physical capital st. Therefore, the period t budget constraint for
the middle age becomes
ct + st  (1  t)wtht:
The period t+ 1 budget constraint in elderly age is
dt+1 
 
1   kt+1

Rt+1st;
3
where dt+1 is consumption, 
k
t+1 is the period t + 1 capital income tax rate, Rt+1(> 0) is
the gross return from investment in capital, and Rt+1st is the return from savings.
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Period t middle-aged individuals care about their children's income ; wt+1ht+1. Chil-
dren's human capital in period t+1, ht+1, is a function of government spending on public
education, xt, and parents' human capital, ht. In particular, ht+1 is formulated by using
the following equation:
ht+1 = D (xt)
 (ht)
1  ;
where D(> 0) is a scale factor and  2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of education technology
with respect to education spending.
We note that private investment in education may also contribute to human capital
formation. For example, parents' time (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995, 2001, 2003; Glomm
and Kaganovich, 2008) or spending (Glomm, 2004; Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal, 2005;
Kunze, 2014) devoted to education may complement public education. In the present
study, we abstract private education from the main analysis to simplify the presentation
of the model and focus on the eect of public education on growth and utility.
We assume that parents are altruistic toward their children and concerned about their
income in middle age, wt+1ht+1. The preferences of an individual born in period t  1 are
specied by the following expected utility function of the logarithmic form:
Ut = ln ct +  fln dt+1 +  lnwt+1ht+1g ;
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor and (> 0) denotes the intergenerational degree of
altruism. We substitute the budget constraints and human capital production function
into the utility function to form the following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
fstg
ln [(1  t)wtht   st] + 

lnRt+1st +  lnwt+1D (xt)
 (ht)
1 	 :
By solving this problem, we obtain the following savings and consumption functions:
st =

1 + 
(1  t)wtht;
ct =
1
1 + 
(1  t)wtht;
dt+1 =

 
1   kt+1

Rt+1
1 + 
(1  t)wtht:
2.2 Firms
Each period contains a continuum of identical rms that are perfectly competitive prot
maximizers. According to Cobb{Douglas technology, they produce a nal good Yt us-
2The results are qualitatively unchanged if capital income tax is on the net return from saving rather
than the gross return from saving.
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ing two inputs: aggregate physical capital Kt and aggregate human capital Ht  Ntht.
Aggregate output is given by
Yt = A (Kt)
 (Ht)
1  ,
where A(> 0) is a scale parameter and  2 (0; 1) denotes the capital share.
Let kt  Kt=Ht denote the ratio of physical to human capital. The rst-order condi-
tions for prot maximization with respect to Ht and Kt are
wt = (1  )A (kt) ; and t = A (kt) 1 ;
where wt and t are labor wages and the rental price of capital, respectively. The con-
ditions state that rms hire human and physical capital until the marginal products are
equal to the factor prices. We assume the full depreciation of capital.
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Public education expenditure is nanced by taxes on labor income and capital income.
The government budget constraint in period t is
twthtNt + 
k
t Rtst 1Nt 1 = Nt+1xt;
where twthtNt is aggregate labor income tax revenue, 
k
t Rtst 1Nt 1 is aggregate capital
income tax revenue, and Nt+1xt is aggregate expenditure on public education. By dividing
both sides of the above expression by Nt, we obtain a per capita form of the constraint:
twtht +
 kt Rtst 1
1 + n
= (1 + n)xt: (1)
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The market-clearing condition for capital is Kt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality of
total savings by the middle-aged population in period t; Ntst, to the stock of aggregate
capital at the beginning of period t + 1, Kt+1. By using kt+1  Kt+1=Ht+1, ht+1 =
Ht+1=Nt+1, and the savings function, we can rewrite the condition as
(1 + n)kt+1ht+1 =

1 + 
(1  t)wtht: (2)
The following denes the economic equilibrium in the present model.
Denition 1. Given a sequence of policies,

t; 
k
t ; xt
	1
t=0
, an economic equilibrium is a
sequence of allocations fct; dt; st; kt+1; ht+1g1t=0 and prices ft; wt; Rtg1t=0 with the ini-
tial conditions k0(> 0) and h0(> 0), such that (i) given
 
wt; Rt+1; t; 
k
t ; xt

; (ct; dt+1; st)
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solves the utility maximization problem; (ii) given (wt; t), kt solves a rm's prot
maximization problem; (iii) given (wt; ht; kt) ;
 
t; 
k
t ; xt

satises the government
budget constraint; (iv) the arbitrage condition holds, t = Rt; and (v) the capital
market clears: (1 + n)kt+1ht+1 = st.
In the economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of the middle-aged in period t, V Mt ,
and that of the old in period t, V ot , can be expressed as functions of scal policy and
physical and human capital as follows:
V Mt = V
M
 
A (kt)
 ; ht; xt; 
k
t ; 
k
t+1

 (1 +  (1 + )) ln (1  )A (kt) ht   (1 + n)xt +  kt A (kt) ht
+  (1  ) (1 + ) ln xt +  ln
 
1   kt+1

+  (1  ) (1 + ) lnD (ht)1  + C; (3)
V ot = V
o
 
A (kt)
 ; ht; 
k
t

 ln  1   kt + lnA (kt) ht(1 + n) +  ln(1  )A (kt) ht; (4)
where C includes constant terms and is dened by
C   (  1 + ) ln 
(1 + n)(1 + )
+ (lnA+  ln(1  )A)+

ln
1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 

:
We use the government budget constraint in (1) to replace t with 
k
t and xt. The
derivations of (3) and (4) are provided in Appendix B.1.
3 The Politics
In this section, we consider voting on scal policy. In particular, we employ probabilistic
voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In this voting scheme, there is electoral com-
petition between two oce-seeking candidates. Each candidate announces a set of scal
policies subject to the government budget constraint. As demonstrated in Persson and
Tabellini (2000), the two candidates' platforms converge in the equilibrium to the same
scal policy that maximizes the weighted-average utility of voters.
In the present framework, the young, middle-aged, and elderly have an incentive to
vote. While the young may benet from public education expenditure in the future, we
assume that they are unable to vote because they are below the voting age. Thus, the
political objective is dened as the weighted sum of the utility of the middle-aged and
old, given by ~
t  !V ot + (1 + n)(1  !)V Mt , where ! 2 [0; 1] and 1  ! are the political
weights placed on the old and middle-aged in period t, respectively. The weight on the
middle-aged is adjusted by the gross population growth rate, (1+n), to reect their share
of the population. To gain the intuition, we divide ~
t by (1 + n)(1  !) and redene the
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objective function as follows:

t =
!
(1 + n)(1  !)V
o
t + V
M
t ;
where the coecient !=(1+n)(1 !) of V ot represents the relative political weight on the
old.
We substitute V Mt in (3) and V
o
t in (4) into 
t. By rearranging the terms, we obtain

t ' !
(1 + n)(1  !)| {z }
(*1)
ln
 
1   kt

+ (1 +  (1 + ))| {z }
(*2)
lnZt
+ (1  ) (1 + )| {z }
(*3)
lnxt + |{z}
(*4)
ln
 
1   kt+1

; (5)
where Zt, representing the disposable income of the young, is dened as
Zt 
 
(1  ) +  kt

A (kt)
 ht   (1 + n)xt: (6)
We use the notation ' because the irrelevant terms are omitted from the expression of

t. The terms (*1), (*2), (*3), and (*4) in (5) represent the relative political weight on
the old, the weight on the young's utility of lifetime consumption, the altruism toward
children, and the weight on the marginal cost of capital income taxation in terms of utility,
respectively. As demonstrated below, the rst three terms play key roles in determining
scal policy.
The political objective function above suggests that the current policy choice aects
the decision on future policy via physical and human capital accumulation. In particular,
the period t choice of  kt and xt aects the formation of physical and human capital
in period t + 1. This in turn inuences the decision making on scal policy in period
t+1. To demonstrate such an intertemporal eect, we employ the concept of the Markov-
perfect equilibrium under which scal policy today depends on the current payo-relevant
state variables. In the present framework, the payo-relevant state variables are physical
capital, kt, and human capital, ht. Thus, the expected rate of capital income tax for
the next period,  kt+1, is given by the function of the next period stock of physical and
human capital,  kt+1 = T
k (kt+1; ht+1). By using recursive notation with z
0 denoting the
next period z; we can dene a Markov-perfect political equilibrium as follows:
Denition 2. A Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions, hT; T k; Xi,
where T : <++  <++ ! [0; 1] is a labor income tax rule,  = T (k; h), T k :
<++<++ ! [0; 1] is a capital income tax rule, and  k = T k(k; h); X : <++<++ !
<++ is a public education expenditure rule, x = X(k; h), such that the following
conditions are satised:
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(i) The capital market clears,
(1 + n)k0h0 =

1 + 
(1  T (k; h)) (1  )A (k) h; (7)
(ii) Given k and h; hT (k; h); T k(k; h); X(k; h) = argmax
 subject to  k0 = T k (k0; h0) ;
the capital market-clearing condition in (7), the government budget constraint,
T (k; h) (1  )A (k) h+ T k(k; h)A (k) h = (1 + n)X(k; h); (8)
and the human capital formation function, h0 = D(h)1  (X(k; h)).
3.1 Characterization of the Political Equilibrium
To obtain a set of functions in Denition 2, we conjecture that the capital income tax
rate in the next period,  k0, is independent of physical and human capital:
 k0 =  k;
where  k 2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter. Based on this conjecture, the rst-order
conditions with respect to  k and x are
 k : ( 1)
!
(1+n)(1 !)
1   k +
(1 +  (1 + ))A (k) h
Z
 0; (9)
x : ( 1)(1 +  (1 + )) (1 + n)
Z
+
(1  ) (1 + )
x
= 0: (10)
A strict inequality holds in (9) if  k = 0: By using these conditions, we can verify the
conjecture and obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
max

0;

1   f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g    (1 + )

 !
(1 + n)(1  !) 

1   f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g : (11)
There is a Markov-perfect political equilibrium such that the policy functions are
given by
T k(k; h) =  kun  1 
1

 !
(1 + n)(1  !) ;
X(k; h) =
Xun
1 + n
A (k) h;
T (k; h) = un  1  1 +  (1 + )
(1  ) ;
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where
  !
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  )) ;
Xun  (1  ) (1 + )

:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The subscript \un" implies that the choice of scal policy is unconstrained. In the
next section, we consider several cases of restrictions on the choices and compare them
with the unconstrained case. The result in Proposition 1 suggests that the tax rates,
 kun and un, and public education expenditure, Xun, are aected by the weights of the
political objective function, (*1), (*2), and (*3) in (5). To understand these eects, we
reformulate  kun, un, and (1 + n)x=A (k)
 h as follows:
 kun = 1 
1

266666641 +
(*2)+(*3)z }| {
1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
!
(1 + n)(1  !)| {z }
(*1)
37777775
 1
;
un = 1  1
1  
266666641 +
(*1)z }| {
!
(1 + n)(1  !) +
(*3)z }| {
 (1  ) (1 + )
1 +  (1 + )| {z }
(*2)
37777775
 1
;
Xun =
266666641 +
(*1)z }| {
!
(1 + n)(1  !) +
(*2)z }| {
1 +  (1 + )
 (1  ) (1 + )| {z }
(*3)
37777775
 1
:
These expressions indicate the following properties. First, the term (*1) implies that
the greater political power of the old leads to a larger weight of the utility of consumption
for the old. This incentivizes the government to shift the tax burden from the old to the
young and reduce public education expenditure. Second, the term (*2) implies that an
increase in the weight on the young's utility of lifetime income gives the government an
incentive to shift the tax burden from the young to the old and reduce the tax burden
on the young by cutting public education expenditure. Third, the term (*3) implies that
greater altruism toward children provides the government with an incentive to increase
public education expenditure by raising capital and labor income tax rates. Finally, as
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a corollary to the rst point, population aging, because of decreased fertility, results in
a shift of the tax burden from the old to the young and a reduction in public education
expenditure.
3.2 Steady-state Growth
Based on the result in the previous subsection, we derive the steady-state growth rate
of the economy and investigate how it is aected by population aging. To present the
analysis, consider per capita output, yt, which is dened by yt  Yt=Nt = A (kt) ht.
Then, the growth rate of per capita output is
y0
y
=
A (k0) h0
A (k) h
;
where z0 denotes the next period z(= k; h; y). In the steady state with k0 = k, the
growth rate of per capita output, y0=y, is equal to the growth rate of human capital, h0=h.
Therefore, in what follows, we focus on the steady-state growth rate of human capital.
To derive the steady-state growth rate of human capital, we recall the human capi-
tal formation function, h0 = D(h)1 (x). Given the policy function of x presented in
Proposition 1, we can reformulate the formation function as
h0
h
= D

Xun
1 + n
A (k)

: (12)
By substituting this into the capital market-clearing condition in (7) and rearranging the
terms, we obtain the law of motion of physical capital as
k0 =

1+
(1  un) (1  )
(1 + n)D
 
Xun
1+n
 (A (k))1  :
This equation implies that a unique and non-trivial steady state exists and that for
any initial condition k0 > 0; the sequence of k stably converges to the unique steady state.
By computing the steady-state value of k and substituting it into (12), we can write the
law of motion of human capital as
h0
h
=
h0
h

un


D

Xun
1 + n
 1 1 (1 ) " 
1+
(1  un) (1  )
1 + n
# 
1 (1 )
(A)

1 (1 ) : (13)
This equation suggests that the growth rate is aected by the relative political weight
of the old, !=(1 + n)(1   !), through public education expenditure, Xun; and the labor
income tax rate, un. As described above, an increase in the political weight on the old,
!=(1 + n)(1   !), results in a shift of the tax burden from the old to the young and a
reduction in public education expenditure. In other words, population aging raises the
labor income tax rate un and lowers the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP,
Xun. Therefore, aging has a negative impact on the steady-state growth rate via the
choice of scal policy.
10
4 Fiscal Policy Constraints
The analysis in the previous section showed that population aging aects scal policy
formation and that this in turn reduces the steady-state growth rate. This result suggests
that given that populations grow older in most developed countries, these countries are
under pressure to take action against low growth rates. For this policy purpose, we here
consider three alternative policy choice constraints: a minimum level of public education
expenditure, an upper limit of the capital income tax rate, and a combination of the
two constraints. We compare these three cases of constraints with the unconstrained
case presented in the previous section in terms of steady-state growth and welfare across
generations.
4.1 Minimum Level of Public Education Expenditure
We rst consider the following minimum constraint on public education expenditure,
which is introduced as an unchangeable rule of law:
Nt+1xt
Yt
 Xxc(> Xun);
whereXxc 2 (0; 1  ) is an exogenously given lower bound of the ratio of public education
expenditure to GDP. The minimum constraint, Xxc, is bounded above by 1    since
Xxc = 1   is feasible as long as the labor income tax rate is 100%; that is,  = 1.
The problem of the government under the minimum constraint on public education
expenditure is to choose a set of scal policy to maximize the political objective function
in (5) subject to the above constraint. Given the assumption of Xxc > Xun, the constraint
is binding at an optimum: (1 + n)x = Xxc  A(k)h. The associated capital and labor
income tax rates are given as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP is con-
strained by Nt+1xt=Yt  Xxc(> Xun) where Xxc 2 (0; 1  ). If the following
conditions hold,
1 Xxc
1     1

(1 +  (1 + ))  !
(1 + n)(1  !) 
 (1 +  (1 + ))
(1  ) Xxc ;
then there is a Markov-perfect political equilibrium such that the policy functions are
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given by
T k(k; h) =  kxc  1 
1 Xxc

"
1 +
1 +  (1 + )
!
(1+n)(1 !)
# 1
;
X(k; h) =
Xxc
1 + n
A (k) h;
T (k; h) = xc  1  1 Xxc
1  
"
1 +
!
(1+n)(1 !)
1 +  (1 + )
# 1
:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The subscript \xc" in the expressions of the policy functions in Proposition 2 means
that the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP is binding at the minimum level,
Xxc. Based on the characterization of the political equilibrium in Proposition 2, we com-
pare the cases with and without the minimum constraint on public education expenditure
in terms of the capital income tax rate, economic growth, and welfare across generations.
Hereafter, the old at the timing of the introduction of a constraint is called the initial old.
Proposition 3. Consider the political equilibrium in the presence of the minimum con-
straint on public education expenditure presented in Proposition 2.
(i) The growth rate and capital and labor income tax rates are higher in the political
equilibrium in the presence of the constraint than in the political equilibrium in the
absence of the constraint: h0=hjxc > h0=hjun,  kxc >  kun, and xc > un.
(ii) The initial old are made worse o, whereas the steady-state generations are made
better o by the introduction of the constraint: V o0 jxc < V o0 jun and limt!1 V Mt

xc
>
limt!1 V Mt

un
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The introduction of the minimum constraint forces the government to increase public
education expenditure. This action stimulates human capital accumulation and thus
works to increase the growth rate. However, the increased expenditure incentivizes the
government to raise the capital income tax rate. This lowers the welfare of the initial
old because they owe the tax burden but benet nothing from scal policy. In addition,
an increased labor income tax rate lowers the disposable income of current and future
generations, implying a negative income eect on economic growth. Thus, there are two
opposing eects on economic growth, and the result in Proposition 3(i) shows that the
former positive eect outweighs the latter negative eect. This fact implies that future
generations benet from increased income and thus are made better o by the introduction
of the constraint.
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4.2 Upper Limit of the Capital Income Tax Rate
Alternatively, we assume that the following upper limit of the capital income tax rate is
introduced as an unchangeable rule of law:
 kt ; 
k
t+1   kkc
 
<  kun

;
where  kkc 2

0;  kun

is an exogenously given upper limit of the capital income tax rate.
This constraint enables the government to lower the tax burden of the old, which is ex-
pected to improve the welfare of the initial old. The problem of the period t government
is choosing a set of scal policy,

 kt ; t; xt
	
, that maximizes the political objective func-
tion in (5) subject to the above upper limit constraint. The constraint is binding at an
optimum:  kt = 
k
t+1 = 
k
kc: The corresponding policy functions of x and  are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the capital income tax rate is constrained by  kt = 
k
t+1 
 kkc
 
<  kun

: There is a Markov-perfect political equilibrium such that the policy func-
tions are given as follows:
T (k; h) =  kkc;
X(k; h) =
Xkc
1 + n
A (k) h;
T (k; h) = kc  1  1
1   
(1 +  (1 + ))   1    1   kkc
1 +  (1 + ) (+  (1  )) ;
where
Xkc 
 (1 + )  (1  )  1    1   kkc
1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  )) :
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The subscript \kc" implies that the capital income tax rate is constrained and binding
at the upper limit constraint,  kkc. We compare the result in Proposition 4 with that in
Proposition 1 and obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Consider the steady-state political equilibrium in the presence of the
upper limit constraint of the capital income tax rate,  kt = 
k
t+1   kkc
 
<  kun

, as in
Proposition 4.
(i) The ratio of public education expenditure to GDP and the growth rate are lower and
the labor income tax rate is higher in the presence of the constraint than in the
absence of the constraint: Xkc < Xun , h
0=hjkc < h0=hjun, and kc > un.
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(ii) The initial old are made better o, whereas the steady-state generations are made
worse o by the introduction of the constraint: V o0 jkc > V o0 jun and limt!1 V M

kc
<
limt!1 V M

un
.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The government wants to set the capital income tax rate to  k =  kun, but it is now
constrained by the upper limit,  kkc(< 
k
un). Because of this constraint, the government is
forced to cut public education expenditure and raise the labor income tax rate. This in
turn lowers the growth rate of human capital.
Next, consider the welfare of the initial old and steady-state generations. The welfare
of the initial old is improved by the introduction of the constraint because their capital
income tax burden is reduced. The welfare of the steady-state generations is given by
V Mt ' (1 +  (1 + )) ln

(1  ) Xj +  kj

A (kj)

+  (1  ) (1 + ) ln Xj
1 + n
A (kj)
 +  ln
 
1   kj

+ f1 +  (1 + )g lnht;j;
where j = un (kc) holds in the absence (presence) of the constraint. The rst three
terms are constant along the steady-state paths, and the last term grows along the paths.
Because the growth rate of human capital is lower in the presence of the constraint than
in its absence, the negative eect of the constraint via the fourth term becomes larger
over time. Therefore, the steady-state generations are made worse o by the introduction
of the constraint.
4.3 Combination of the Two Constraints
The analyses in the previous two subsections show that the introduction of a constraint on
either public education expenditure or capital income tax, but not on both, is not Pareto-
improving. In particular, the minimum constraint on public education expenditure leads
to an increase in the capital income tax rate and thus lowers the welfare of the initial old;
the upper limit constraint of the capital income tax rate leads to a decrease in the public
education expenditure and thus lowers the welfare of the steady-state generations.
To overcome these shortcomings, we here consider the case where both constraints
are introduced. The minimum constraint of public education expenditure prohibits the
government from reducing expenditure in response to the introduction of the upper limit
constraint of the capital income tax rate. In addition, the upper limit constraint prohibits
the government from raising the capital income tax rate in response to the introduction
of the minimum constraint of public education expenditure. Therefore, the combination
is expected to compensate for each other's limitations.
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The problem of the government in period t is choosing a set of scal policy to maximize
the political objective function in (5) subject to the two constraints. There are at most
four possible solutions to the problem: (i) both  k and x are non-binding; (ii) only x
is binding; (iii) only  k is binding; and (iv) both x and  k are binding. The rst three
cases do not appear to exist because they contradict the assumption of the constraints.
Therefore, there is a political equilibrium where both constraints are binding, as described
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that public education expenditure and the capital income tax
rate are constrained by Nt+1xt=Yt  Xxc(> Xun) and  k   kkc(<  kun); where 
Xxc; 
k
kc

satises
1

(Xxc   (1  )) <  kkc 
1

Xxc:
If the following condition holds:
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 

1   f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g ;
then there is a Markov-perfect political equilibrium such that the policy functions are
given as follows:
T k(k; h) =  kkc;
X(k; h) =
Xxc
1 + n
A (k) h;
T (k; h) = xkc  1
1  
 
Xxc    kkc
 2 [0; 1):
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The subscript \xkc" in xkc implies that both constraints are binding. To understand
the growth and welfare implications of the combination of the two constraints, let us rst
compare the growth rates in the absence and presence of the constraints. The growth
rate in the presence of the two constraints, denoted by h0=hjxkc, is given by replacing Xun
and un in (13) with Xxc and xkc; respectively. By direct calculation, we have
h0
h

un
? h
0
h

xkc
, (Xun)1  (1  un) ? (Xxc)1  (1  xkc)
, (Xun)1 
 
(1 Xun)  
 
1   kun
| {z }
LHS
? (Xxc)1 
 
(1 Xxc)  
 
1   kkc
| {z }
RHS
;
(14)
where the second line comes from un =
 
Xun    kun

= (1  ) (Proposition 1) and xkc = 
Xxc    kkc

= (1  ) (Proposition 6).
The expression in (14) suggests that the growth rate in the presence of the two con-
straints lowers as the upper limit of  k,  kkc, declines. Keeping this in mind, we rst
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consider the case of  kkc = 
k
un and illustrate the graph of (14), taking Xxc on the hori-
zontal axis as in Figure 1. From the gure, we can nd a critical level of Xxc, denoted
by ~Xxc, such that LHS ? RHS , Xxc 7 ~Xxc. Thus, LHS < RHS holds in (14)
if Xxc < min
n
1  ; ~Xxc
o
. In other words, the introduction of the two constraints in-
creases the steady-state growth rate if  kkc = 
k
un and Xxc 2

Xun;min
n
1  ; ~Xxc
o
.
However, as illustrated in Figure 1, the introduction of the two constraints is less likely
to attain a higher growth rate as the upper limit of the capital income tax rate decreases.
[Figure 1 is here.]
The result established thus far has the following welfare implications. First, the initial
old are made better o because the capital income tax burden is lowered by the upper
limit constraint. As a consequence of this improvement, the initial young generation
is made worse o. Second, future generations in the steady state are made better o
(worse o) if the steady-state growth rate increases (decreases) Thus, there still arises an
intergenerational trade-o in terms of welfare. The combination of the two constraints
does not solve the problem that arises when each constraint is independently engaged.
5 Planner's Allocation
In the previous section, we use the Pareto criterion to evaluate the welfare consequence
of alternative constraints. In this section, we take an alternative approach by deriving
an optimal allocation that maximizes an innite discounted sum of generational utilities
for an arbitrary social discount factor (e.g., Bishnu, 2013). In particular, consider a
benevolent planner who can commit to all his or her choices at the beginning of a period,
subject to the resource constraint. Assuming such a planner, we evaluate the political
equilibrium by comparing it with the planner's allocation in terms of long-run growth
rates, the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP, and welfare across generations.
5.1 Characterization of the Planner's Allocation
The planner is assumed to value the welfare of all generations. In particular, the objective
of the planner is to maximize a discounted sum of the lifecycle utility of all current and
future generations:
SW =
1X
t= 1
tUt;
under the resource constraint:
Ntct +Nt 1dt +Kt+1 +Nt+1xt = A (Kt)
 (Ht)
1  ;
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or
ct +
1
1 + n
dt + (1 + n)kt+1ht+1 + (1 + n)xt = A (kt)
 ht;
where k0 and h0 are given. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the planner's discount factor.
In the present framework, the state variable ht does not lie in a compact set because
it continues to grow along an optimal path. To reformulate the problem into one in which
the state variable lies in a compact set, we undertake the following normalization:
~ct  ct=ht; ~dt  dt=ht; and ~xt  xt=ht:
Then, the above resource constraint is rewritten as
~ct +
1
1 + n
~dt + (1 + n)kt+1D (~xt)
 + (1 + n)~xt = A (kt)
 ; (15)
and the utility function becomes
U 1 =  ln ~d0 +  (1 + ) lnh0 +  ln k0 +  ln(1  )A;
U0 = ln ~c0 +  ln ~d1 +  ln k1 +  (1 + ) ln ~x0 + (1 +  (1 + )) lnh0
+  ln(1  )A+  (1 + ) lnD;
Ut = ln ~ct +  ln ~dt+1 +  ln kt+1 +  (1 + ) ln ~xt +  (1 +  (1 + ))
t 1X
j=0
ln ~xj
+ (1 +  (1 + )) lnh0 +  ln(1  )A+ f (1 + ) + t (1 +  (1 + ))g lnD; t  1:
The planner's objective function is now given by
SW (k0) ' 

ln k0+
1X
t=0
t

ln ~ct +


ln ~dt +  ln kt+1 + 

 (1 + ) + (1 +  (1 + ))

1  

ln ~xt

;
(16)
where the constant terms are omitted from the expression. Thus, we can express the
Bellman equation for the problem as follows:
V (k) = max
f~c; ~d;k0;~xg

ln ~c+


ln ~d+  ln k0 + 

 (1 + ) + (1 +  (1 + ))

1  

ln ~x+ V (k0)

;
(17)
subject to (15), where k0 denotes the next period stock of capital and V () is the optimal
value function. Solving the problem in (17) leads to the following result.
Proposition 7. Given k0 and h0, the planner's allocation, fct; dt; kt+1; xtg1t=0, is char-
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acterized by
ct =
1

A (kt)
 ht;
dt =
(1 + n)

A (kt)
 ht;
xt =
1
1 + n

 

1 +



  ( + 1)

1

A (kt)
 ht;
kt+1 =
 + 1
(1 + n)D

1
1+n

   1 + 

  ( + 1)	

1

A (kt)

1 
;
where
  1
1   (1  )

1 +



+  (1  ) + 

 (1 + ) + (1 +  (1 + ))

1  

;
1  :
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
5.2 Numerical Analysis
Based on the result in Proposition 7, we compute the corresponding steady-state capital,
ratio of public education expenditure to GDP, growth rate, and welfare across generations.
We then compare these with those in the political equilibrium in the presence and absence
of the constraints and evaluate the constraints in terms of growth and welfare. To proceed
with the numerical analysis, we calibrate the model in the absence of the constraint in
Section 3 to the Japanese economy; note that the result would be qualitatively unchanged
when using other countries' data.
We x the share of capital in production at  = 1=3 and assume that each pe-
riod lasts 30 years; these assumptions are standard in quantitative analyses of the two-
period overlapping-generations model (e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008, 2012; Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012; Lancia and Russo, 2016). Our selection of  is 0.98,
which is also standard in the literature. Since the agents in the present model plan over
generations that span 30 years, we discount the future by (0:98)30.
We assume that the gross population growth rate for each period is 1:0232. This
gure comes from the average rate in Japan during 1995{2014. For , the estimate in
Card and Krueger (1992) implies an elasticity of school quality of 0:12. In addition, recent
simulation studies suggest that  is in the range of 0:1 0:3 (Cardak, 2004) and 0:05 0:15
(Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998). Following these studies, we set  = 0:12. For !, we set
! = 0:4 to attain interior solutions for  k and  .
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To determine , we focus on the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP. In
particular, the ratio is given by
Nt+1xt
Yt
= Xun  (1  ) (1 + )!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
;
when we assume no scal constraint. Given  = 1=3,  = (0:98)30 ; 1 + n = 1:0232,
 = 0:12, and ! = 0:4, we can solve this expression for  by using the ratio observed in
Japan. The average ratio during 1995{2014 is 0:0349. We can determine  by solving the
above expression and obtain  = 0:611.
The productivity of human capital, D, is normalized to D = 1. For the productivity
of nal goods, we use the data on the per capita GDP gross growth rate of 1:249 in Japan
during 1995{2014. We substitute this gure and the values of , , n, , , and D into the
equation expressing the per capita growth rate of human capital and solve the expression
for A to obtain A = 58:215. The source of the data for the gross population growth rate,
ratio of public education expenditure to GDP, and per capita growth rate is the World
Development Indicators.3
Figure 2 illustrates the numerical results for the ratio of public education expenditure
to GDP (Panel (a)), steady-state capital (Panel (b)), and steady-state growth rates (Panel
(c)). In each panel, we compare the planner's allocation with the political equilibrium
in the presence and absence of the constraints by taking the planner's discount factor 
from 0 to 1 on the horizontal axis.
[Figure 2 is here.]
To illustrate the numerical examples of the three cases of constraints in Section 4,
we consider the following three scenarios. In the rst scenario, the minimum constraint
on public education expenditure is set to maximize the steady-state growth rate: Xxc =
argmax (h0=hjxc). In the second scenario, the upper limit constraint on the capital income
tax rate is set to zero:  kkc = 0. In the third scenario, the two constraints are both in
play, but the upper limit constraint on the capital income tax rate is set to the rate in
the absence of the constraints: Xxkc = argmax (h
0=hjxkc) and  kxkc =  kun. In Table 1, the
values of the constraints are marked with asterisks and the resulting scal policy variables
are given with no asterisk.
[Table 1 is here.]
Panel (a) shows that in the planner's allocation, the ratio of public education expendi-
ture to GDP increases as the planner's discount factor  increases. A higher  implies that
3Source: https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi (Accessed on August 26, 2017).
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the planner attaches a larger weight to future generations, who thus have more incentive
to invest in human capital through public education. Because of this incentive, the plan-
ner's allocation is more likely to attain a higher ratio of public education expenditure to
GDP than in the political equilibrium as his or her discount factor increases. However,
when the minimum constraint is introduced into the political equilibrium, the planner's
allocation always attains a lower ratio than that in the political equilibrium, regardless of
the planner's discount factor. This result is straightforward since the minimum constraint
is set suciently high to maximize growth.
Panel (b) plots steady-state capital. In the planner's allocation, steady-state capital is
hump-shaped, which peaks around  = 0:75. This fact suggests two opposing eects of 
on capital accumulation: a positive eect produced by the planner's incentive to bequeath
more physical capital to future generations and a negative eect caused by the crowding
out eect of human capital investment. The corresponding eects also appear in the
political equilibrium, but the negative eect is strengthened by the minimum constraint
of public education expenditure. This then implies that the political equilibrium attains
lower steady-state capital than that in the planner's allocation in the presence of the
minimum constraint for most discount factors. However, the negative eect is not as
strong in the absence of the minimum constraint. Thus, the political equilibrium in the
absence of the minimum constraint attains higher steady-state capital than the planner's
allocation for most discount factors. The presence of the minimum constraint is thus
crucial to determining the relative size of the steady-state capital stock in the planner's
allocation and the political equilibrium.
Panel (c) plots the steady-state growth rate of human capital. In the planner's alloca-
tion, the steady-state growth rate increases as the planner's discount factor increases. A
higher  provides an incentive for the planner to invest more in education. In addition, as
argued above, a higher  creates a positive eect on capital accumulation, which works to
increase public education expenditure. Because of these two positive eects on education
expenditure, the planner's allocation attains a higher growth rate as his or her discount
factor increases. When the planner's allocation is compared with the political equilib-
rium, we nd that the political equilibrium attains a higher (lower) growth rate than the
planner's allocation for most discount factors when the minimum constraint of public ed-
ucation is active (inactive). This is because the constraint pushes up spending on public
education. Thus, the minimum constraint is crucial to determining the performance of
economic growth in the political equilibrium relative to the planner's allocation.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of economic growth and distribution of utility across
generations when  = 0:5.4 In particular, we take the ratio of the growth rate in the
4The result is qualitatively unchanged when  varies from 0.1 to 0.9.
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political equilibrium allocation to that in the planner's allocation for each period. We
also take the corresponding ratio of utility for each generation. The terms un; xc; kc;
xkc; and pl in the gure correspond to the subscripts introduced earlier. The line denoted
by j=pl (j = un; xc; kc; xkc) implies the ratio of a concerned variable in the political
equilibrium to that in the planner's allocation. For example, the line denoted by un=pl in
Panel (a) shows the ratio of the growth rate in the political equilibrium in the absence of
any constraints to that in the planner's allocation. Each ratio implies that the political
equilibrium outweighs the planner's allocation when the ratio is above unity.
[Figure 3 here.]
For the reasons already stated, the political equilibrium attains a higher (lower) growth
rate than the planner's allocation in the presence (absence) of the minimum constraint on
public education expenditure across periods, as illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 3. Panel
(b) illustrates the distribution of utility across generations. The gure indicates that in
the presence of the minimum constraint on public education expenditure, the rst eight
generations are made worse o by the political decision making because these generations
suer from a high tax burden to pay for public education expenditure. However, the
generations from nine onward benet from past public education expenditure via human
capital accumulation. This positive eect outweighs the negative tax burden eect, and
thus the political equilibrium outweighs the planner's allocation in terms of utility from
generation nine onward. Such a positive eect does not arise in the absence of the mini-
mum constraint; generations from period three onward are made worse o by the political
decision making.
6 Conclusion
The present study develops a two-period-lived overlapping-generations model with phys-
ical and human capital accumulation. Public education contributes to human capital
formation and it is funded by taxing the labor income of the working generation and
capital income of the retired generation. Within this framework, we employ probabilistic
voting to demonstrate the political determinant of both taxes and expenditure and in-
vestigate its impacts on economic growth. The model predicts that aging has a negative
impact on economic growth via the choice of scal policy.
To resolve the negative growth eect, we propose three alternative constraints that
limit the choice of taxes and/or expenditure: a minimum level of public education ex-
penditure, an upper limit of the capital income tax rate, and a combination of the two.
We show that the minimum constraint benets future generations at the expense of the
current old. The upper limit constraint benets the current old at the expense of future
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generations. In addition, a combination of the two cannot solve the trade-o inherent to
each constraint. Our analysis therefore indicates that the constraints on the scal policy
choice involve a trade-o between current and future generations in terms of welfare.
We also consider a benevolent planner's allocation to view the welfare implications
of the political equilibrium from an alternative perspective. We nd that the political
equilibrium attains a higher (lower) growth rate than the planner's allocation for most
discount factors of the planner when the minimum constraint of public education is active
(inactive). In addition, in the presence of the minimum constraint, earlier generations
are made worse o, while later generations are made better o by the political decision
making. Hence, political decision making on taxes and expenditure inevitably involve an
intergenerational trade-o in terms of welfare.
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A Proofs and Supplementary Explanations
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume rst that the rst-order condition with respect to  k holds with an equality. We
substitute (10) into (9). By rearranging the terms, we obtain
(1 + n)x = (1  ) (1 + )

!
(1 + n)(1  !)
 1
A (k) h
 
1   k : (18)
We substitute this into (9) and solve for  k to obtain
 k =  kun  1 
1

 !
(1 + n)(1  !) ;
where  is dened in Proposition 1. Thus, the conjecture is veried as long as  k0 =  k =
 kun.
The corresponding public education expenditure becomes
(1 + n)x =
Xun
1 + n
A (k) h;
where Xun is dened as follows:
Xun  (1  ) (1 + )

:
With the government budget constraint in (8), we can compute the labor income tax rate
as
 = un  1  1 +  (1 + )
(1  ) :
We immediately nd that the tax rates  kun and un are below one. They are greater
than or equal to zero if the following conditions hold:
 kun  0,
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 

1   f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g ;
un  0, !
(1 + n)(1  !) 

1   f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g    (1 + ) :
Therefore,  kun 2 [0; 1) and un 2 [0; 1) hold if the assumption in (11) holds.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Conjecture that the constraint is binding: (1+n)x = XxcA(k)h: The rst-order condition
with respect to  k in (9) holds with an equality since the choice of  k is unconstrained.
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We assume an interior solution of  k and substitute the conjecture (1+n)x = Xxc A(k)h
into (9) to obtain
( 1)
!
(1+n)(1 !)
1   k +
(1 +  (1 + ))A (k) h
((1  ) +  k)A (k) h Xxc  A(k)h = 0:
By rearranging the terms, we obtain  k =  kxc.
We substitute (1+n)x = Xxc A(k)h and  k =  kxc into the rst-order condition with
respect to x in (10) and rearrange the terms. Then, we obtain Xun  Xxc: This condition
holds with a strict inequality by assumption. Thus, the conjecture is veried.
To derive the labor income tax rate, we substitute (1+n)x = Xxc A(k)h and  k =  kxc
into the government budget constraint in (8) and then obtain  = xc. These tax rates
imply that
 kxc  0,
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 
 (1 +  (1 + ))
(1  ) Xxc ;
xc  0,

1 Xxc
1     1

(1 +  (1 + ))  !
(1 + n)(1  !) :

A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We rst compare the growth rates. The growth rate in the absence of the constraint is
given by (13). The growth rate in the presence of the constraint, denoted by h0=hjxc, is
given by replacing Xun and un with Xxc and xc, respectively. By direct comparison, we
have
h0
h

un
? h
0
h

xc
, (Xun)1  (1  un) ? (Xxc)1  (1  xc)
,
264 1+(1+)(1 )
1 Xxc
1  
h
1 +
!
(1+n)(1 !)
1+(1+)
i 1
375

?

Xxc
Xun
1 
,
"
1 +  (1 + ) + !
(1+n)(1 !)

#
(Xun)
1  ? (1 Xxc) (Xxc)1 
, (1 Xun) (Xun)1  ? (1 Xxc) (Xxc)1  :
The right-hand side of the last expression, denoted by RHS, has the following prop-
erties:
@RHS
@Xxc
= RHS  (1  ) Xxc
(1 Xxc)Xxc ;
@RHS
@Xxc

Xxc=Xun
> 0;
@RHS
@Xxc

Xxc=1 
= 0:
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These properties imply that
h0
h

un
<
h0
h

xc
8Xxc 2 (Xun; 1  ) :
We next compare the capital income tax rates. Direct comparison leads to the following
result:
 kun ?  kxc , 1 
1

 !
(1 + n)(1  !) ? 1 
1 Xxc


"
1 +
1 +  (1 + )
!
(1+n)(1 !)
# 1
, 1 Xxc!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  (1 + )
? 1

,  (1 + )  (1  )

? Xxc
, Xun ? Xxc:
Given the assumption of Xun < Xxc, we obtain 
k
un < 
k
xc.
The labor income tax rates are compared as follows:
un 7 xc , 1  1 +  (1 + )
(1  )  7 1 
1 Xxc
1   
1 +  (1 + )
   (1 + )  (1  )
, (1 Xxc)  7    (1 + )  (1  )
,  (1 + )  (1  )

7 Xxc
, Xun 7 Xxc;
where the last line comes from the denition of Xun. Given the assumption of Xun < Xxc,
we obtain un < xc.
Finally, we compare the two cases in terms of the welfare of the initial old and steady-
state generations. The initial old are made worse o by the introduction of the constraint
because the capital income tax rate increases. The welfare of the middle-aged in some
generation t is, from (3),
V Mt = (1 +  (1 + )) ln

(1  )A (kt) ht   (1 + n)xt +  kt A (kt) ht

+  (1  ) (1 + ) ln xt +  ln
 
1   k+  (1  ) (1 + ) lnD (ht)1  + C:
Given that xt = XjA (kj)
 ht, j = un; xc, in the steady state, the above expression is
reformulated as
V Mt;j ' (1 +  (1 + )) ln

(1  ) Xj +  kj 

A (kj)

+  (1  ) (1 + ) ln Xj
1 + n
A (kj)
 +  ln
 
1   kj

+ f1 +  (1 + )g lnhtj:
Recall that kj and 
k
j are constant stationary along the steady-state path. However,
human capital htj grows along the steady-state path and the dierence between ht;un and
ht;xc rises over time. Therefore, V
M
t;un < V
M
t;xc holds in the steady state.

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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Conjecture that the capital income tax rate is binding at  kt = 
k
t+1 = 
k
kc: The rst-order
conditions with respect to  k and x in (9) and (10) are rewritten, respectively, as
 k : ( 1)
!
(1+n)(1 !)
1   kkc
+
(1 +  (1 + ))A (k) h 
(1  ) +  kkc

A (k) h  (1 + n)x  0; (19)
x : ( 1) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + n) 
(1  ) +  kkc

A (k) h  (1 + n)x +
(1  ) (1 + )
x
= 0: (20)
The condition in (20) is reformulated as
(1 + n)x =
(1  ) (1 + )  (1  ) +  kkc
1 +  (1 + ) (+  (1  )) A (k)
 h: (21)
We substitute (21) into (19) and rearrange the terms to obtain
 kun  1 
1

 !
(1 + n)(1  !)  
k
kc:
This condition holds by assumption. Thus, the conjecture is veried.
We next derive the labor income tax rate. The substitution of  k =  kkc and x in (21)
into the government budget constraint in (1) leads to
 = kc  1  1
1   
f1 +  (1 + )g  (1  ) +  kkc
1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  )) :
This expression implies that kc  0 if
 kkc 
1  

 (1  ) (1 + )
1 +  (1 + )
: (22)
With  kkc   kun,  kkc must satisfy
 kkc  min

 kun;
1  

 (1  ) (1 + )
1 +  (1 + )

:
Direct comparison leads to
 kun ?
1  

 (1  ) (1 + )
1 +  (1 + )
, !
(1 + n)(1  !) 7

1    f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g    (1 + ) :
Under the assumption of (11), the last expression holds with an inequality, \>". There-
fore, we have
 kkc  min

 kun;
1  

 (1  ) (1 + )
1 +  (1 + )

=  kun;
implying that kc  0 holds under the assumption of  kkc <  kun.

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A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We rst compare the growth rates. The growth rate in the absence of the upper limit
constraint of the capital income tax rate is given by (13). The growth rate in the presence
of the constraint, denoted by h0=hjkc, is given by replacing Xun and un in (13) by Xkc
and kc, respectively. By direct comparison, we have
h0
h

un
? h
0
h

kc
, (Xun)1  (1  un) ? (Xkc)1  (1  kc) :
By comparing Xun and Xkc; we have
Xun > Xkc ,  (1  ) (1 + )!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
>
 (1  ) (1 + )(1  ) +  kkc	
1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
, 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
>

(1  ) +  kkc
	 !
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))

| {z }
=
,   1   kkc > 0;
which holds for any  kkc 2

0;  kun

: We also compare un with kc and obtain
1  un > 1  kc
, 1
1   
1 +  (1 + )

>
1
1   
f1 +  (1 + )g(1  ) +  kkc	
1 +  (1 + ) (+  (1  ))
, 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
>

(1  ) +  kkc
	 !
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1 +  (1 + ) (+  (1  ))

, 0 > !
(1 + n)(1  !)   
 
1   kkc


,  kun  1 
1


!
(1+n)(1 !)

>  kkc:
The inequality on the last line holds by assumption. Therefore, (Xun)
1  (1  un) >
(Xkc)
1  (1  kc) holds, and thus we obtain h0=hjun > h0=hjkc.
The labor income tax rates un and kc are compared as follows:
un 7 kc , 1  1 +  (1 + )
(1  )  7 1 
1
1   
(1 +  (1 + ))
 
1    1   kkc
1 +  (1 + ) (+  (1  ))
,  1    1   kkc 7 1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))
, !
(1 + n)(1  !)   
 
1   kkc

 7 0
,  kkc 7 1 
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1

=  kun:
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Given the assumption of  kkc < 
k
un, we obtain un < kc.
Next, consider the welfare of the initial old. Eq. (4) indicates that given k and h;
the welfare of the initial old is decreasing in  k. Given that  kkc < 
k
un, their welfare is
improved by the introduction of the constraint.
Finally, consider some generation t in the steady state. From Eq. (3), its lifetime
welfare is
V Mt;j ' (1 +  (1 + )) ln

(1  ) Xj +  kj

A (kj)

+  (1  ) (1 + ) ln Xj
1 + n
A (kj)
 +  ln
 
1   kj

+ f1 +  (1 + )g lnht;j;
where j(= un; kc) denotes the status of the constraint, kj is the steady-state level of
capital, and ht;j is the period t human capital level along the steady-state path. The rst
three terms on the right-hand side are constant along the steady-state path, whereas the
last term grows over time. In the steady state, ht;un > ht;kc holds, and the dierence
between them becomes larger over time. Therefore, V Mt;un > V
M
t;kc holds in the steady state.

A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
When x is binding at the minimum constraint Xxc; the government wants to set the
capital income tax rate above  kun (Proposition 3). However, this choice does not satisfy
the upper limit constraint on  k,  k   kkc(<  kun). Alternatively, when  k is binding at
the upper limit constraint,  k   kkc, the government wants to choose (1 + n)x=y below
Xun (Proposition 5). Such a choice is inconsistent with the minimum requirement on X;
Xkc(> Xun). Thus, x is binding at the minimum constraint Xxc and 
k is binding at the
upper limit constraint,  k   kkc, in the presence of the two constraints.
Recall the rst-order condition with respect to  k and x in (9) and (10). These are
rearranged as follows:
 k : ( 1)
!
(1+n)(1 !)
1   k +
(1 +  (1 + ))A (k) h
Z
 0; (23)
x : ( 1)(1 +  (1 + )) (1 + n)
Z
+
(1  ) (1 + )
x
 0; (24)
where Z   (1  ) +  kA (k) h   (1 + n)x: The strict inequalities hold in (23) and
(24) since the two constraints are binding at  k =  kkc and (1 + n)x = XxcA (k)
 h.
We substitute  k =  kkc and (1 + n)x = XxcA (k)
 h into (23) and obtain
(1 +  (1 + ))
(1  ) +  kkc  Xxc

!
(1+n)(1 !)
1   kkc
: (25)
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Given  kkc < 
k
un; (25) holds with a strict inequality if
(1 +  (1 + ))
(1  ) +  kun  Xxc

!
(1+n)(1 !)
1   kun
:
This is reformulated as Xxc  Xun; which holds by assumption.
Next, we substitute  k =  kkc and (1 + n)x = XxcA (k)
 h into (24) and obtain
(1  ) (1 + )
Xxc
 (1 +  (1 + ))
(1  ) +  kkc  Xxc
: (26)
Given  kkc < 
k
un; (26) holds with a strict inequality if
(1  ) (1 + )
Xxc
 (1 +  (1 + ))
(1  ) +  kun  Xxc
:
This is reformulated as Xun  Xxc; which holds by assumption. The argument thus far
suggests that both constraints are binding. By substituting  k =  kkc and (1 + n)x =
XxcA (k)
 h into the government budget constraint, we obtain
 = xkc  1
1  
 
Xxc    kkc

:
Our nal task is to determine the conditions for which  kkc 2 [0; 1) and xkc 2 [0; 1)
hold. Recall that the capital income tax rate is assumed to satisfy  kkc < 
k
un. Thus,
 kkc 2 [0; 1) holds if  kun 2 [0; 1); that is, if
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 

1    f1 +  (1 + ) ( +  (1  ))g :
The labor income tax rate, xkc, satises xkc 2 [0; 1) if the following conditions hold:
xkc < 1, 1

 (Xxc   (1  )) <  kkc;
xkc  0,  kkc 
1

Xxc:
Thus, we have xkc 2 [0; 1) if
1

 (Xxc   (1  )) <  kkc 
1

Xxc:

A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
We substitute (15) into (17) to reformulate the problem as
V (k) = max
f ~d;k0;~xg

ln

A (k)   1
1 + n
~d  (1 + n)k0D(~x)   (1 + n)~x

+


ln ~d+  ln k0 + 

 (1 + ) +

1   (1 +  (1 + ))

ln ~x+   V (k0): (27)
29
The rst-order conditions with respect to ~d; k0; and ~x are
~d :
1=(1 + n)
~c
=
=
~d
; (28)
k0 :
(1 + n)D(~x)
~c
=

k0
+   V 0(k0); (29)
~x :
(1 + n)k0D(~x) 1 + (1 + n)
~c
=


 (1 + ) + 
1  (1 +  (1 + ))
	
~x
: (30)
We make the guess V (k0) = 0+1 ln k0; where 0 and 1 are undetermined coecients.
For this guess, (29) becomes
(1 + n) D(~x)  k0 = ( + 1)  ~c: (31)
From (30) and (31), we obtain
(1 + n)~x =  

 (1 + ) +

1   (1 +  (1 + ))  ( + 1)

 ~c: (32)
The substitution of (28), (31), and (32) into the resource constraint in (15) leads to
~c =
1

A (k) ;
where
 

1 +



+ ( + 1) (1  ) + 

 (1 + ) +

1   (1 +  (1 + ))

:
The corresponding functions of ~d; ~x; and k0 become
~d = (1 + n)  

 1

A (k) ;
~x =
1
1 + n


 

1 +



+ ( + 1)

 1

A (k) ; (33)
k0 =
 + 1
(1 + n)D

1
1+n
     1 + 


+ ( + 1)
	  1

A (k)
1 
: (34)
Substituting these policy functions into the Bellman equation gives
V (k) = Cons (0; 1) +  ln k;
where Cons (0; 1) includes constant terms. The guess is veried if 0 = Cons (0; 1)
and  = 1. Therefore, 1 and 0 are given by
1 =

1  (1  ) 

1 +



+  (1  ) + 

 (1 + ) +

1   (1 +  (1 + ))

;
0 =
1
1  (1  ) 

1 +



+  (1  ) + 

 (1 + ) +

1   (1 +  (1 + ))

:

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B Supplementary Materials
B.1 Derivation of V Mt and V
o
t
To derive V Mt in (3), recall that the utility of the middle-aged is given by V
M
t = ln ct +
 (ln dt+1 +  lnwt+1ht+1). Given the consumption and savings functions and human cap-
ital formation function in Section 2, this utility function is rewritten as
V Mt = ln
1
1 + 
(1 t)wtht+ ln

 
1   kt+1

Rt+1
1 + 
(1 t)wtht+ lnwt+1D (xt) (ht)1  ;
or,
V Mt = (1 + ) ln(1  t)wtht+  ln
 
1   kt+1

Rt+1+  lnwt+1+  lnxt+ ~ (ht) ; (35)
where
~ (ht)   lnD (ht)1  + ln 1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 
:
(1  t)wtht, in (35), is rewritten as follows:
(1  t)wtht = (1  )A (kt) ht  

(1 + n)xt   
k
t Rtst 1
1 + n

= (1  )A (kt) ht   (1 + n)xt +  kt A (kt) 1 ktht; (36)
where the rst equality comes from the rst-order conditions for prot maximization with
respect to Ht; wt = (1 )A (kt) ; and the government budget constraint in (1), and the
second equality comes from the rst-order conditions for prot maximization with respect
to Kt, t = A (kt)
 1 ; and the capital market-clearing condition, (1 + n)  ktht = st 1:
The term  lnRt+1 +  lnwt+1 is reformulated as follows:
 lnRt+1 +  lnwt+1 =  lnA (kt+1)
 1 +  ln(1  )A (kt+1)
=  (  1 + ) ln kt+1 +  (lnA+  ln(1  )A) ; (37)
where the equality on the rst line comes from the rst-order conditions for prot maxi-
mization with respect to Kt+1 and Ht+1: The term kt+1 in (37) is reformulated by using
the capital market-clearing condition as follows:
kt+1 =
st
(1 + n)ht+1
=
1
(1 + n)D (xt)
 (ht)
1  

1 + 
(1  t)wtht
=
1
(1 + n)D (xt)
 (ht)
1  

1 + 

(1  )A (kt) ht   (1 + n)xt +  kt A (kt) 1 ktht

;
(38)
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where the rst line comes from the capital market-clearing condition, second line comes
from the savings function, and third line comes from the government budget constraint.
By using (36){(38) and rearranging the terms, we can reformulate V Mt in (35) as
follows:
V Mt = (1 +  (1 + )) ln
 
(1  ) +  kt 

A (kt)
 ht   (1 + n)xt

+ (1  ) (1 + ) ln xt +  ln
 
1   kt+1

+ (1  ) (1 + ) lnD (ht)1  + C;
where
C   (  1 + ) ln 
(1 + n)(1 + )
+  (lnA+  ln(1  )A) + ln 1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 
:
We next derive V ot in (4). Recall that V
o
t is dened as V
o
t = ln dt +  lnwtht: This is
rewritten as follows:
V ot = lnRt
 
1   kt

st 1 +  ln(1  )A (kt) ht
= ln
 
1   kt

+ flnA (kt) ht(1 + n) +  ln(1  )A (kt) htg :

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Figure 1: LHS and RHS of Eq. (14).
35
Figure 2: Ratio of public education expenditure to GDP (Panel (a)), steady-state capital
(Panel (b)), and steady-state growth rates (Panel (c)). The symbols pl; un; xc; kc; and xkc
denote the corresponding values in the planner's allocation (pl), political equilibrium in
the absence of any constraint (un), political equilibrium with the minimum constraint on
public education expenditure (xc), political equilibrium with the upper limit constraint
on capital income tax (kc), and political equilibrium with the combination of the two
constraints (xkc), respectively.
36
Labor income Capital income Ratio of public education
tax rate tax rate expenditure to GDP
Absence of constraints 0.0374 0.0299 0.0349
Minimum constraint on 0.6675 0.6649 0.6667*
public education expenditure
Upper limit constraint on 0.0516 0* 0.0344
capital income tax rate
Combination of the two constraints 0.6617 0.0299* 0.451*
Table 1: Numbers marked with asterisks denote the values of the constraints and numbers
without asterisks are the resulting scal variables.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Panel (a): Evolution of growth rates across periods; Panel (b); Distribution of
utility across generations.
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